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Real Property
by Linda S. Finley*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Any survey of Real Property Law1 will certainly include a report of
the "usual suspects" including boundaries, easements, zoning, and the
like, but today's real estate practitioner is expected to be knowledgeable
about other related topics such as the unauthorized practice of law,
taxation, the rights of consumers in foreclosure, and other varied topics.
No survey can discuss every relevant case or topic, but the purpose here
is to provide the reader with a broad understanding of "hot" topics and,
perhaps, lead the reader to more specific research and debate about
these topics.
II.

LEGISLATION

"At midnight on Thursday, March 20'h, [2014,] the 152nd Georgia
General Assembly completed one of the fastest legislative sessions in
over two decades."2 Even though "the second year of the biennial

* Shareholder in the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC,
Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University (BA., 1978); Mercer University, Walter F. George
School of Law (J.D., 1981). Member, State and Federal Bars of Georgia and Florida,
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court.
The Author wishes to give special thanks to Kitty S. Davis who, after years of assistance,
faces her last year of handling the administrative tasks necessary to bring this Article to
print. The Author wishes Ms. Davis the best for the future. Additional thanks goes to
Peter L. Lublin, Esq., who provided insight for the Article, and Carol V. Clark, Esq.
Particularly, the Author directs the reader to Carol V. Clark, 2014 JudicialUpdate, 2013
REAL PROP. LAW INST. (Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia) (2014).
1. For an analysis of Georgia real property law during the prior survey period, see
Linda S. Finley, Real Property,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 65 MERCER L. REV. 233
(2013).
2. End of 2014 Legislative Session Report, GA. UTIL. CONTRACTORS Ass'N, INC.,
www.guca.com/advocacy/legislative issues/2014_ReportsUpdateslegislative-report-week
10-final.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2014).

152

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

legislative term was an expedited affair due to the upcoming primary
elections scheduled for May 20, [20141," the last few days of the session
were filled with the usual late nights as legislators pushed to secure
passage of their bills before midnight.3 Perhaps legislation regarding
real property was overshadowed by proposed legislation regarding
medicinal marijuana,4 expansion of Medicaid coverage to comply with
the federal Affordable Care Act,5 and the regulation of smartphonebased car service providers such as Uber and Lyft.' However, a few
changes bear discussion.
The General Assembly enacted House Bill 954,' which changed the
8
definition of "fair market value" as it relates to ad valorem taxation.
The bill amended section 48-5-2(3)(B) of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.) 9 relating to definitions applied to ad valorem
tax.'0 Specifically, the bill added criteria for the tax assessor to apply
in determining the fair market value of real property subject to
regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(Section 8 Housing) or Georgia housing programs and included analysis
of the following:
Rent limitations, operational requirements, and any other restrictions
imposed upon the property in connection with the property being
eligible for any income tax credits ... or receiving any other state or
federal subsidies provided with respect to the use of the property as
residential rental property; provided.., that such properties... shall
not be considered comparable real property for assessment or appeal
of assessment of other properties.'

The governor signed the bill on April 29, 2014, and it became effective
as law on July 1, 2014.12

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Id.

9.

O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3XB) (2010 & Supp. 2014).

H.R.
H.R.
H.R.
H.R.

Bill 885,
Bill 990,
Bill 907,
Bill 954,

Reg. Sess.
Reg. Sess.
Reg. Sees.
Reg. Sess.

(2014).
(2014).
(2014).
(2014).

10. Ga. H.R. Bill 954.
11. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(BXvi).
12. Status History, 2013-2014 Regular Session-H 954, GA. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
9 54
(last visited Aug. 20,
httpj/www.legislgalgov/legislation/en-us/Display/20132014/HB/
2014).
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House Bill 750,"3 signed by the governor and effective on April 21,
2014,14 created an exemption to the mortgage broker licensing requirement for employees of non-profit entities. 5 The purpose of the exemption is to allow employees of non-profit entities to negotiate favorable
mortgage terms for homeowners facing financial distress within the
confines of their employment with the non-profit organization.'
Senate Bill 12517 was enacted to codify (and limit) the duty against
harm owed by owners of land to trespassers. 8 In fact, the Georgia
Chamber of Commerce labeled the legislation as "an essential tool to
protect property owners from unfair and unwarranted litigation brought
by criminals.""
Specifically, the statute provides that a lawful
possessor of land, meaning the "landowner, occupant of the land, holder
of any easement to the land, or lessee of the land . . owes no duty of
care to a trespasser except to refrain from causing a willful or wanton
injury."0 The revision preserves the common law doctrine of attractive
nuisance in Georgia.21 The bill was signed into law by the governor
and became effective July 1, 2014.2
The Flint River Drought Protection Act"a was amended to better
protect water resources in Georgia, particularly southwest Georgia,
during drought conditions. 4 The bill increases conservation standards
for farm irrigation and clarifies the Environmental Protection Division
(EPDYs authorization to augment stream flow in the Flint River basin
when necessary during times of drought. 5 If severe drought is
predicted during any particular year or drought conditions are declared,
the EPD may limit the amount of land serviced by irrigation systems to

13. Ga. H.R. Bill 750, Reg. Sess. (2014).
14. Status History, 2013-2014 Regular Session-HB 750, GA. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
http://www.legislgalgov/legislation/en-us/Display/20132014/HB/750 (last visited Aug. 20,
2014).
15. Ga. H.R. Bill 750.
16. Seeid. § 1 (exempting from licensing requirements"[nionprofit corporations making
mortgage loans... for the disadvantaged.").
17. Ga. S. Bill 125, Reg. Sess. (2014).
18. Id.
19. GBAN Legislative Update, GEORGIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (July 1, 2014),
http://gachamber.com/GBAN_6.30.14.
20. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-3 (Supp. 2014).
21. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-3(c).
22. Status History, 2013-2014 Regular Session-SB 125, GA. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
http://www.legislgalgov/legislation/en-us/Display/20132014/SB/125 (last visited Aug. 20,
2014).
23. O.C.G.A. tit. 12 ch. 5, art. 9 (2012 & Supp. 2014).
24. Ga. S. Bill 213, Reg. Sess. (2014).
25. Id. §§ 3-4.
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maintain an acceptable stream flow in the Flint River.2 6 The amendment also provides a means to create water conservancy pilot projects
and programs for the use of surface and ground water and set minimum
levels for irrigation-system efficiencies."
III.

28
CONDEMNATION AND EMINENT DOMAIN

In Bray v. Department of Transportation,29 a portion of Bray's
property was taken by the Georgia Department of Transportation (the
Department) for the construction of a road, resulting in a suit by Bray
for inverse condemnation and damages caused by the Department's
The trial court
alleged negligent construction of improvements.
30
dismissed Bray's claim for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that Bray had failed to comply with the
ante litem notice provisions set forth in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-2611 that
require notice be given as a prerequisite to a tort claim against the state.
Second, the trial court dismissed the claim because it found the action
asserted professional negligence, and Bray failed to comply with
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1,32 which requires the filing of an expert affidavit
with the complaint. 3
The Georgia Court of Appeals first noted that an earlier condemnation
award was only "conclusive as to all damages to the remaining property,
foreseen or not, resulting from proper construction of the road improvements."34 Furthermore, damage to remaining property caused by
negligent or improper construction may be recovered in a separate
inverse-condemnation claim because the condemnor has a constitutional
duty to pay damages for the taking or damaging of land. 5 This
constitutional duty cannot be excused even if the condemnor claims the
negligence of an independent contractor caused the damage. 6

26. Id. § 4.

27. Id. § 5.
28. This section was authored by Ivy N. Cadle, attorney in the law firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Macon, Georgia. Adjunct Professor of Law,
Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law. University of Georgia (B.S., cum
laude, 2000; MAcc, 2002); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2007).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
29. 324 Ga.App. 315, 750 S.E.2d 391 (2013).
30. Id. at 315-16, 750 S.E.2d at 392-93.
31. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26 (2013).
32. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (2014).
33. Bray, 324 Ga. App. at 315-16, 750 S.E.2d at 393.

34. Id.
35. Id.

36. Id.
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The court held that the trial court erred by dismissing the inversecondemnation claim on the grounds that Bray failed to give notice to the
Department as the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA)3 7 requires." In
so holding, the court reasoned that "[n]o sovereign immunity exists
where a cause of action for inverse condemnation lies, because the
Constitution itself
affords the right" to bring the claim, and the GTCA
39
does not apply.

The court then considered the dismissal for failure to include an
expert affidavit. 40
Holding that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 applies-but
construing the complaint liberally-the court concluded that the claim
was based on both professional negligence and other negligence.41
Accordingly, the court remanded the case for a determination on the
merits of the related claims that were not controlled by O.C.G.A. § 9-119.1.42

In Emery v. ChattoogaCounty,43 the property owner, Emery, brought
an appeal after the trial court denied his petition to set aside a
declaration of taking for condemnation of real property filed by
Chattooga County, Georgia (the County). Emery filed the petition to set
aside the declaration of taking because he was the only holdout after all
his neighbors voluntarily conveyed their interests in land so their
neighborhood road could become part of the county road system. As part
of the County road system, the road would be paved and maintained by
the County."
Emery claimed the County abused or misused its power because his
private property was taken and condemned for the benefit of a few
private citizens, and the exercise was not "reasonably related to the
development, growth, or enhancement of the public roads of Georgia."45
The court of appeals acknowledged that "[tihe condemnor is not
authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property
to be used by private individuals for private use and private gain." 6

37. O.C.G.A. tit. 50 ch. 20, art. 2 (2013).
38.
39.
Bros.,
40.
41.
42.

Bray, 324 Ga. App. at 316, 750 S.E.2d at 393.
Id. at 317, 750 S.E.2d at 393 (alteration in original) (quoting Powell v. Ledbetter
251 Ga. 649, 651, 307 S.E.2d 663, 666 (1983)).
Id. at 317, 750 S.E.2d at 393-94.
Id. at 318, 750 S.E.2d at 394.
See id.

43. 325 Ga. App. 587, 753 S.E.2d 149 (2014).
44. Id. at 587, 753 S.E.2d at 150.
45. Id. at 588, 753 S.E.2d at 150 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 32-3-1(b) (2012)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

46. Id. (quoting Dep't of Transp. v. Livaditis, 129 Ga. App. 358, 361, 199 S.E.2d 573,
576 (1973)).
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However, the court found this road would be a public road even though
the general public would not frequently travel it and the primary users
of the road would be limited to the twenty residents who lived along the
road.4 7 In its holding, the court cited the precedent that "[i]f the public
[has] a right and but one person uses the [road], the purpose is deemed
M
That situation is distinct from one in which the public
to be public.'"
is generally excluded and "the use of the [road] is limited to that of an
individual enterprise. '
The court also reviewed factors that demonstrated the intent of the
County.5 ° Those factors indicated there was no bad faith on the part
of the County when it exercised the power of eminent domain.5 Three
contributing factors were considered.52 First, the court noted that the
local fire chief approached the County about acquiring the road after the
fire department responded to a fire in the area.5 Second, the court
considered the existence of a County policy "to acquire, improve and
maintain roads as parts of the county were developed."54 Third, the
court weighed the request by the other residents that the County apply
the policy to their road. 5
56 ADC
In ADC Investments, LLC v. Department of Transportation,
Investments, LLC (ADC) sought to introduce evidence at trial concerning
an anticipated income stream from a changeable digital billboard that
likely would have been erected on the property rather than the static
billboard that actually existed on the property. This appeal resulted
when the trial court granted partial summary judgment to the Department.57 The trial court's ruling served to limit ADC's damages to "the
value of the property as it existed on the date of the taking, i.e., with a
static billboard."'8

47. Id. at 588, 753 S.E.2d at 150-51.
48. Id. at 588, 753 S.E.2d at 151 (alterations in original) (quoting Livaditis, 129 Ga.
App. at 362, 199 S.E.2d at 577).
49. Id. at 588-89, 753 S.E.2d at 151 (alteration in original) (quoting Livaditis, 129 Ga.
App. at 362, 199 S.E.2d at 577).
50. Id. at 589, 753 S.E.2d at 151.

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.

55. Id. Practice Tip: Just because a public facility will not serve many members of the
public directly does not invalidate the public purpose of a stated project. Public purpose
is only destroyed when the general public will have no access to the project. See id. at 58889, 753 S.E.2d at 151.
56. 325 Ga. App. 685, 754 S.E.2d 648 (2014).
57. Id. at 685, 754 S.E.2d at 649.
58. Id.
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The Department condemned a twenty-five square-foot parcel of
property located near the intersection of Highway 316 and State Route
20 in Lawrenceville, Georgia (the City). 59 The court of appeals noted
that 'Itihe only improvement on the property on the date of the taking
..was a static, double-faced billboard."0 The property was owned by
Crown Media, who leased the site to ADC, who then subleased the
property to The Lamar Company, LLC (Lamar). The term of the lease
and the sublease were both 99 years with remaining terms of 91
years.6 '
The sublease was important because it provided for a minimum fixed
guaranteed annual rent and an alternative rent whereby Lamar would
pay ADC 25% of its net revenues if such amounts exceeded $12,000 per
year. 2 That the sublease authorized Lamar to unilaterally "alter or
replace the billboard structure itself during the term of the Sublease"
was also important. 3
On the date of the taking, a City ordinance was in effect that
specifically prohibited for-profit digital signs."
However, four days
before the taking, the mayor and council of the City conducted a first
reading of an amendment to the ordinance "that would specifically
permit digital signs under certain circumstances, and less than four
months after the date of taking, [the City] amended its sign ordinances
to permit digital advertising" at sites near the subject property.65
For evidence of value related to a zoning change to be admissible, a
condemnee must "show that a change in zoning to allow the usage is
probable, not remote or speculative, and is so sufficiently likely as to
have an appreciable influence on the present market value of the
property.'6 6 The Department argued against the admission of the
evidence on two grounds.6 7 First, it asserted that the rezoning was "too
remote and speculative to be considered as a matter of law,"' and
second, even if the change in zoning was reasonably probable, the value
of the billboard as improved should be inadmissible because "the jury

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 685-86, 754 S.E.2d at 649.
Id. at 686, 754 S.E.2d at 649-50.
Id. at 686, 754 S.E.2d at 650.
Id.
Id.

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 687, 754 S.E.2d at 650 (quoting Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke Cnty. v.
Watson, 276 Ga. 276, 277, 577 S.E.2d 769, 770 (2003)).
67. Id. at 689, 754 S.E.2d at 652.
68. Id.
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cannot evaluate the property as though the new use were an accomplished fact."6 9
The court disagreed with the Department and held that the cases cited
by the Department were distinguishable because they concerned
condemnees who claimed unimproved land could be valued as though it
7°
Furthermore, the court found that
was subdivided and developed.
ADC's experts used discounts to account for the time and risk related to
1
the conversion of the billboard. The experts also applied discounts to
the anticipated income stream.72 Accordingly, the grant of summary
judgment by the trial court was reversed, and the case was remanded for
further proceedings.73
IV.

EASEMENTS, COVENANTS, AND BOUNDARIES

74

"Easements and declarations of covenants are both viewed as
contracts, and courts apply the usual rules of contract construction in
interpreting both types of documents. On the other hand, actions to
boundary lines between properties require a factual determinaestablish
75
tion."
5
In Fulton County v. City of Sandy Springs, the City of Sandy
Springs, along with two homeowners, John E. Balsam and Jerry
Burnstein, filed a lawsuit against Fulton County specifically requesting
the trial court to find that Fulton County retained ownership of two
detention ponds located within the Sandy Springs city limits, and
therefore, had a duty to maintain them. In 1976, Fulton County
constructed the ponds on the grounds of the Arlington Cemetery in
response to homeowners' complaints and threats to sue over drainage

69. Id. (quoting Woodland Partners Ltd. P'ship v. Dep't of Transp., 286 Ga. App. 546,
550, 650 S.E.2d 277, 282 (2007)).

70. Id.
71. Id.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 690, 754 S.E.2d at 652.
74. This section was authored by Sabrina Lynn Atkins, attorney in the law firm of
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia College
& State University (B.A., cum laude, 2010); Mercer University, Walter F. George School
of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, -2013).
75. Linda S. Finley, Real Property,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 65 MERCER L. REV.
233, 260 (2013); see also Richardson v. Ga. Power Co., 308 Ga. App. 341, 343, 708 S.E.2d
10, 12 (2011) (stating that "express easements are construed by applying the rules of

contract construction"); Gibson v. Rustin, 297 Ga. App. 169, 174,676 S.E.2d 799,804 (2009)
(holding that disputed boundaries are questions of fact); Britt v. Albright, 282 Ga. App.
206, 209, 638 S.E.2d 372, 375 (2006) ("Restrictive covenants, as contracts, are interpreted
according to the rules of contract construction.").
76. 295 Ga. 16, 757 S.E.2d 123 (2014).
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problems.77 Fulton County was granted two easements to facilitate the
construction of the drainage ponds, which granted it the "right to erect,
construct, reconstruct, replace, remove, maintain and use on said
described property a dam and detention pond.., as part of the public
drainage system.""' However, in 2005, the Georgia General Assembly
created the City of Sandy Springs whose boundaries encompassed the
ponds. The long-neglected-and wholly forgotten--detention ponds
created water problems for Sandy Springs homeowners, therefore
necessitating the initiation of the lawsuit by Sandy Springs against
Fulton County.79
The trial court found in favor of Sandy Springs, and Fulton County
promptly appealed. 0 According to Fulton County, it was prohibited
from maintaining the detention ponds pursuant to the Georgia constitution, which states in relevant part that "[n]o county may... provide any
[storm water and sewage collection and disposal system] ...inside the
boundaries of any municipality or any other county except by contract.""' The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling
and held that Fulton County was not providing a storm water and
sewage collection and disposal system without an intergovernmental
contract.8 2 Critically, the supreme court concluded that the easements
granted Fulton County ownership and the obligation to maintain the
structures that it decided to build.'
Until Fulton County legally
transfers, terminates, or abandons the easements, Fulton County retains
84
ownership and its obligation to maintain the easements.
Additionally, the supreme court rejected the second argument raised
by Fulton County that the "easement[s] to build and maintain the ponds
and dam were automatically terminated by the creation of [the city ofi
Fulton County relied on O.C.G.A. § 36-36-7,86
Sandy Springs."8s
which provides that ownership of roads and rights of way automatically
transfer to newly created municipalities. 7
The court held that
O.C.G.A. § 36-36-7 does not include all property rights generally." The

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 16, 757 S.E.2d at 124.
Id.
Id. at 16-17, 757 S.E.2d at 125.
Id. at 16, 757 S.E.2d at 124.
Id. at 17, 757 S.E.2d at 125 (quoting GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. III(b)(1)).
Id.
Id. at 17-18, 757 S.E.2d at 125-26.
Id. at 18, 757 S.E.2d at 126.
Id. at 17-18, 757 S.E.2d at 125.
O.C.G.A. § 36-36-7 (2012).
Fulton Cnty., 295 Ga. at 18, 757 S.E.2d at 125.
Id.
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court noted that under the same circumstances, ownership of parks and
public buildings does not automatically transfer to the newly created
5 9 Furthermore, the court relied upon the absence of any
municipality.
statute that indicates that easements terminate by operation of law
9
when a new municipality is created. "
In McLeod v. Clements,9 a dispute arose between two neighbors
regarding the free use of a well located on Clement's land pursuant to
a 1971 agreement. McLeod is the successor in interest of a parcel of
land previously owned by H.E. McLeod, Sr., and Clements is the
successor in interest of a parcel of land previously owned by H.E.
McLeod, Jr. Both properties were once a unified parcel owned by H.E.
McLeod Sr., who subsequently divided the land and sold the parcel upon
which a well sat to H.E. McLeod Jr.9 2 In 1971, McLeod Jr. granted Mr.
and Mrs. McLeod Sr. the right to maintain a water line and to use "the
well 'free from all charges' while any of the grantees lived on the
property" (the 1971 Agreement).9 3 In 1992, McLeod Jr. transferred the
land to Michael and Sally McLeod, who then transferred a parcel to
Ryan and Melissa Reeves in August of 1996. The Reeves' warranty
deed, recorded on September 27, 1996, contained a "Special Agreement,"
which provided that the Reeves would provide water to McLeod, and
McLeod would pay electricity and maintenance costs. However, the 1971
Agreement was not recorded until the Reeves obtained title to the parcel
in 1996. 94
The property changed hands several times from 1996 to 2007, until

Clements purchased the land pursuant to a "Special Warranty Deed"
that referenced the Reeves' Special Agreement. McLeod then filed suit
against Clements, primarily alleging that Clements was refusing to

89. Id.
90. Id. However, Justice Benham, in his dissent, argued that an easement does not
create an affirmative duty to construct or maintain any structure built on it, but the holder

assumes the risk of liability for any damages resulting from any nuisance created by the
holder's failure to maintain its structure. Id. at 21-22, 757 S.E.2d at 127-28 (Benham, J.,
dissenting). He noted that Sandy Springs did not ask for damages but rather sought a
declaratory judgment requiring Fulton County to maintain the ponds. Id. at 22,757 S.E.2d
at 128. However, requiring Fulton County to maintain the ponds necessarily meant the
following: (1) that Fulton County was providing constitutionally prohibited storm water
collection and disposal services to Sandy Springs because it was the ponds' only original
purpose; (2) that Fulton County cannot abandon the easement if its use is required; and
(3) that Fulton County cannot transfer the easement to Sandy Springs, which now receives
the full benefit of Fulton County's obligation. See id. at 19-23, 757 S.E.2d at 126-29.
91. 326 Ga. App. 840, 755 S.E.2d 346 (2014).
92. Id. at 840, 755 S.E.2d at 347-48.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 841, 755 S.E.2d at 348.
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supply water to McLeod pursuant to the 1971 Agreement. Clements
maintained that he was not aware of the 1971 Agreement. Notably,
Clements argued that the 1971 Agreement was unenforceable because
it was outside the chain of title and, alternatively, that the original
grantees no longer lived on the property and therefore were not
benefiting from the agreement.9 5 Additionally, Clements contended
that pursuant to the Special Agreement, McLeod had "failed to
reimburse him for electricity and maintenance of the well."96 However,
McLeod contended that the Special Agreement was unenforceable
because it conflicted with the 1971 Agreement and McLeod never agreed
to the cost provisions in the Special Agreement. 7
The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
Clements on the unenforceability of the 1971 Agreement. 8 The court
of appeals, affirming the trial court, held that "even for a covenant
running with the land, a bona fide purchaser for value is not bound by
such a covenant recorded outside of his chain of title unless he has
either actual or constructive notice."9 9 Furthermore, the court of
appeals held that McLeod's long-standing use of the well without paying
costs did not create a quasi-easement because, although the pipes
running from the well to McLeod's property were visible, their presence
was consistent with the 1996 Special Agreement and did not serve as
constructive notice of the 1971 Agreement.0 0
In CrabappleLake Parc Community Ass'n v. Circeo,'°' the Crabapple
Lake Parc Community Association (the Association) brought suit against
two homeowners, Lacey and Circeo, seeking a declaratory judgment that
it had the right to build a footbridge between Lacey and Circeo's
properties to provide access to the community lake. 1 2 The original
plat map referencing the community included a multi-acre lake and the
community's protective covenant that restricted the use of the lake to
"Owners of Lake Lots" only.'0 3 Additionally, the plat map initially
granted an easement for "Maintenance & Access" between two plots of
land purchased in 1995 and 2001 by Lacey and Circeo, respectively.10 4
In 2008, the Association changed the protective covenant to allow all

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 841-42, 755 S.E.2d at 348.
Id. at 842, 755 S.E.2d at 348.
Id. at 842, 755 S.E.2d at 348-49.
Id. at 842, 755 S.E.2d at 349.
Id. at 843, 755 S.E.2d at 349.
Id. at 846, 755 S.E.2d at 351.

101. 325 Ga. App. 101, 751 S.E.2d 866 (2013).

102. Id. at 101, 751 S.E.2d at 868.
103. Id. at 102, 751 S.E.2d at 868.
104. Id. at 102-03, 751 S.E.2d at 869.
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community property owners access to the lake and proposed to develop
05
the easement by building a footbridge over it for the community."
The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial
0 6
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Association.
First, the court affirmed that the easement's use of "access" was
intended to grant access for the purpose of maintaining the lake by the
Association itself.'0 7 However, because Circeo and Lacey purchased
their lots when only lake-lot owners could access the lake, the Association's attempt to grant access to the entire community constituted "an
impermissible change in the scope or character of the original easement."108 The court of appeals held that the trial court erred when it
found that the Association could not build a footbridge over the easement
because the original conveyance and the relevant law recognized the
power "to build on the easement if it is 'reasonably necessary' to
109
Material issues of fact
accomplish the purpose of the easement."
existed concerning whether the footbridge was reasonably necessary for
the Association to access the lake for maintenance and whether the
footbridge would cause unreasonable damage to Lacey and Circeo's
properties or unreasonably interfere with their enjoyment of their
properties."0
In Jones v. Morris,"' the court of appeals upheld a trial court's
injunction against a property owner that prevented her from running a
water pump connected to a community lake because of the depletion of
2
water in the lake caused by her pumping." A restrictive covenant
granted a perpetual appurtenant easement across the surface area of the
community lake to all lake-lot owners and provided that no lake-lot
owner could build a structure on the lake without the permission of the
majority of other owners. Carla Jones, a lake-lot owner, installed a
pump in the lake so that she could water her lawn with the lake water.
However, after running the pump for a month, the lake water level
dropped more than a foot."' The court of appeals held that Jones's
actions violated the intent of the protective covenants because allowing
Jones to drain the lake would render the covenant's provisions meaning-

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 103, 751 S.E.2d at 869.
Id. at 101, 751 S.E.2d at 868.
Id. at 109, 751 S.E.2d at 873.
Id. at 110, 751 S.E.2d at 873.
Id. at 111, 751 S.E.2d at 874.
Id. at 111-12, 751 S.E.2d at 874.
325 Ga. App. 65, 752 S.E.2d 99 (2013).
Id. at 65-66, 752 S.E.2d at 100-01.
Id. at 66, 752 S.E.2d at 100-01.
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less, which grant all property owners the right to maintain the lake for
boating, swimming, and fishing."4
In Sermons v.Agasarkisian,"5 the court of appeals reversed a trial
court order regarding a dispute between three property owners and the
alley existing behind the properties. 116 In 1995, Veronica and Barry
Sermons (the Sermons) purchased a lot, one of three, that had an alley
located behind it. The Sermons thereafter began developing the alley for
suitable ingress and egress onto their property. In doing so, they cleared
trees, obtained permits to build a driveway along the alley, and
continuously used and maintained the driveway. However, in 2008,
Agasarkisian, a neighbor, dumped a load of dirt in the middle of the
driveway to prevent the Sermons' use of it. The Sermons, in response,
filed a lawsuit for nuisance and trespass and sought a judgment
declaring that the alley existed for the mutual use of all adjacent
landowners. Agasarkisian counterclaimed that the alley had been
abandoned, therefore making it a part of his lot."'
The court of appeals reversed the trial court, stating that Georgia law
requires that the owner of an express easement demonstrate a "clear,
unequivocal, and decisive.., intent to abandon the easement" before a
court can find abandonment as a matter of law."' Further, even
though "there appears to be some conflict in the Supreme Court of
Georgia's authority on whether an express easement may be abandoned
by non-use for a period of 20 years," the Sermons did not own the
property for more than twenty years before actively improving the alley
for use as a driveway."19
Another notable case handed down by the court of appeals was Herren
v. Mitchell Electric Membership Corp." ° In Herren, the court affirmed
summary judgment for Mitchell Electric, who used herbicide to destroy
a row of hedges planted by the landowners to prevent trespassing. 2 '
The court held that, regardless of whether Mitchell Electric had
alternatives other than destroying the hedge, "the hedge interfered with
the power company's full use of the easement," and destroying the hedge,

114. Id. at 68, 752 S.E.2d at 102.
115. 323 Ga. App. 642, 746 S.E.2d 596 (2013).
116. Id. at 642, 746 S.E.2d at 597.
117. Id. at 643-45, 746 S.E.2d at 597-98.
118. Id. at 645, 746 S.E.2d at 599 (quoting Whipple v. Hatcher, 283 Ga. 309, 310, 658
S.E.2d 585, 586 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Id. at 646-47, 746 S.E.2d at 599-600.
120. 323 Ga. App. 517, 747 S.E.2d 63 (2013).
121. Id. at 517, 747 S.E.2d at 64.
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rather than trimming it, was reasonably necessary "to operate, repair,
and maintain the electric lines on the easement."' 22
123

V.

FORECLOSURE OF REAL PROPERTY

After the tumultuous series of cases in 2013, culminating in a supreme
court decision specifying which entities are authorized to foreclose, 124
2014 was a relatively staid year in the world of Georgia non-judicial
foreclosure. The case during the past year most likely to have farreaching effects was HWA Properties,Inc. v. Community & Southern
Bank. 125 Therein, the court of appeals permitted a bank to seek a post
foreclosure deficiency action against the guarantor on a mortgage where
the bank failed to act in accordance with O.C.G.A. 44-14-161121 by
confirming the foreclosure sale. 127 This decision was a substantial
departure from prior case law, in which the Georgia courts clearly
interpreted the confirmation requirement to apply to guarantors. 12' In
reaching its decision, the court of appeals focused closely on the
language of the specific guaranty at issue, which included a term by
which the guarantor agreed to waive all defenses available to the
borrower except for the full discharge of the debt.129 "In fact, the
guaranty specifically provides that [the guarantor] shall remain liable
for any deficiency remaining after the foreclosure of any property
securing the note, whether or not the liability of [the] Borrower or any
other obligor for such deficiency is discharged pursuant to statute or
judicial decision."" 0 While the decision at issue was made on somewhat limited factual grounds, it is not yet clear how widely the exception
will be applied. The borrower, of course, is expected to seek further
appellate review from the supreme court. This decision is likely to
expose guarantors to liability where lenders had already foreclosed in

122. Id. at 521, 747 S.E.2d at 67.
123. This section was authored by Dylan W. Howard, shareholder in the law firm of
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University
(B.A., 1999); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2002).
124. See generally You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 293 Ga. 67, 743 S.E.2d 428
(2013).
125. 322 Ga. App. 877, 746 S.E.2d 609 (2013), cert. denied, No. S13C1731, 2013 Ga.
LEXIS 980 (Nov. 18, 2013).
126. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161 (2002).
127. HWA Props. Inc., 322 Ga. App. at 887-88, 746 S.E.2d at 617.
128. See First Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. Kunes, 230 Ga. 888, 890, 199 S.E.2d 776, 778
(1973) ("[It would not matter for purposes of this statute whether the debtors were
primarily or secondarily liable on the debt.").
129. HWA Props., Inc., 322 Ga. App. at 886-87, 746 S.E.2d at 616-17.
130. Id. at 887, 746 S.E.2d at 617.
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the past few years and previously thought that such liability had been
waived as a result of the decision not to confirm the sale. As a result,
this decision should be the basis for substantial additional litigation in
the next few years.
Another case of interest in the foreclosure confirmation arena is RESGA LJY, LLC v. YD.I., Inc. 1 ' In that case, the court of appeals
addressed the issue of whether a trial court should permit a lender to
conduct a new, non-judicial foreclosure sale where confirmation of a prior
sale is denied. 2 O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161(c) provides that if confirmation
is denied, the court may order resale of the property at issue for good
cause shown.133 The trial court merely found a lack of good cause to
grant a resale. The lender argued that it relied in good faith on the
appraisal at issue in setting the bid price for the foreclosure sale and
that this good faith provided sufficient good cause to permit re-sale. As
evidence of this good faith reliance, the lender demonstrated that the
decision maker reviewed the appraisal, consulted with a team of former
real estate developers and market specialists about the appraisal, and
ultimately chose a bid price higher than the appraisal. The trial court
found that, notwithstanding these efforts, the lender should have
detected critical flaws in the appraisal upon which it relied, including
errors in the appraisal's use of comparable sales.3
The court of
appeals applied the broad abuse-of-discretion standard and affirmed the
trial court's order.1" 5
VI.

136
SALE OF REAL PROPERTY

Hayes Lemmerz International-Georgia, Inc. v. Punch Property
International NV13 7 involved a dispute regarding the purchase of a
manufacturing plant. On June 13, 2008, the plaintiff entered into a
purchase and sale agreement with the defendant for the sale of the
manufacturing plant (the Purchase Agreement).
The Purchase
Agreement included the sale of trade fixtures and equipment. The
purchase price was $5 million. The defendant paid the plaintiff an

131. 322 Ga. App. 607, 745 S.E.2d 820 (2013).
132. Id. at 607, 745 S.E.2d at 821.
133. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161(c).
134. RES-GA LJY, LLC, 322 Ga. App. at 607-09, 745 S.E.2d at 821-22.
135. Id. at 609, 745 S.E.2d at 822.
136. This section was authored by Montoya McGee Ho-Sang, attorney in the law firm
of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, in Atlanta, Georgia. Dillard
University (B.A., summa cum laude, 2004); Emory School of Law (J.D., 2007). Member,
State Bars of Georgia and Tennessee.
137. No. 2:09-CV-00021-RWS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87176 (N.D. Ga. June 20, 2013).
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earnest-money payment of $1 million. The Purchase Agreement was
subsequently amended on October 31, 2008 to include the purchase and
sale of additional equipment and to increase the purchase price from $5
30,
million to $5,150,000. The sale was scheduled to close on
138 January
2009; however, the defendant failed and refused to close.
After the sale failed to close, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit asserting
causes of action for specific performance and breach of contract. The
plaintiff later filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking judgment
on the breach of contract claim. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia granted judgment to the plaintiff on that
claim. In an effort to mitigate its damages, the plaintiff entered into an
Exclusive Sales Agency Contract on September 28, 2010 and set an
asking price of $3,995,000. The plaintiff received and accepted three
offers: the first two offers were withdrawn by the interested purchasers,
but the third offer went to closing. The plaintiff eventually sold the
property for $1,850,000 on June 4, 2012. The plaintiff netted $1,700,992
from the sale. The plaintiff further mitigated its damages by selling
some equipment from the property for $15,500 and retained $80,000 in
earnest money from one of the prospective purchasers who failed to
retained the defendant's $1 million
close. Additionally, the 13plaintiff
9
earnest-money payment.
The district court determined that the defendant breached the
Purchase Agreement and that the plaintiff was entitled to damages. 4"
The court focused its attention on deciding whether the defendant4
breached a contract for the sale of real property or the sale of goods.' '
A special damage rule applies to the breach of a contract to sell real
property, which provides that the measure of damages is the difference
between the contract price and the fair market value of land at the time
of the breach. 42
In connection with the breach of a contract for the sale of goods, "[tihe
seller may resell the goods concerned or the undelivered balance
thereof. Where the resale is made in good faith and in a commercially
reasonable manner the seller may recover the difference between the
resale price and the contract price together with any incidental
damages1 3... but less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's
breach." 4

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

*1-3.
*4-6.
*6.
*8-9.
*7.
*8 (quoting O.C.G-A. § 11-2-706 (2002)).
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"Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any commercially
reasonable charges, expenses, or commissions incurred in stopping
delivery, in the transportation, care, and custody of goods after the
buyer's breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods or
'
otherwise resulting from the breach. " 44
The court began its analysis by applying each scenario to the matter
at hand.145 The court determined that, if the Purchase Agreement was
treated strictly as a contract for the sale of real property, the plaintiff
failed to prove the amount of damages under the special damage rule for
Specifically, the court
contracts for the sale of real property.14
concluded the plaintiff "failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence the fair market value of the real property at the time of
breach."14 7 Indeed, "[tihe only evidence [the] Plaintiff presented of fair
market value of the real property was $1,850,000-the gross price for
which [the] Plaintiff sold the [manufacturing plant and various
equipment] on June 4, 2012." 1'4 However, this value did not "represent
value of the real property on the date of breach, January
the fair market
149
30, 2009."
The court determined that the plaintiff failed to prove the damages for
breach of an agreement to sell goods. 5 o The court also noted that the
plaintiff failed to present any evidence of the contract price of the
equipment and "failed to show a resale price of the equipment, as the
equipment [had] not been resold."'51 Moreover, the plaintiff "failed to
of the evidence the fair market value of the
prove by a preponderance
1 52
equipment."
Further, the court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover
incidental damages. 5
If the Purchase Agreement was "treated
strictly as a contract for the sale of real property, incidental damages
[would not be] recoverable under the special damage rule."'54 If the
Purchase Agreement

144. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 11-2-710 (2002)).

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at *8-9.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9-10.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *10-11.
Id. at *11.
Id.
Id.
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[was] treated as a contract for the sale of real property and for the sale
of goods, incidental damages [would not be] recoverable because [the
plaintiff had] failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the incidental damages claimed were incurred "in the transportation,
care, and custody of goods after the buyer's breach," as opposed to in
the care and custody of the real property."
In light of the above analysis, the court determined that the plaintiff
was entitled only to nominal damages in the amount of $100.156
However, in light of the breach itself, the court determined that the
plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees in the amount of $525,000.1"7
VII.

TAXATION OF REAL PROPERTY 155

In Terrell County Board of Tax Assessors v. Goolsby,5 9 the court of
appeals determined that the superior court used an erroneous construction of the bona fide conservation-use covenant statute. 160 The Goolsbys, who own 448.5 acres in Terrell County, obtained a ten-year
"conservation use assessment of agricultural property covenant
agreement" pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4,161 "to obtain certain tax
advantages, effective January 1, 2007. "1"2 After entering into the

covenant, the Goolsbys started a commercial grain business on part of
the property. Upon discovering the existence of the business, the Terrell
County Board of Tax Assessors (the board) notified the Goolsbys that
they were in violation of their conservation-use covenant and specified
that it was the Goolsbys' application for a business license on December
9, 2009 that constituted the breach. 6 '
According to the board, the Goolsbys violated the covenant by
operating "some other type of business" as set forth in O.C.G.A. § 48-57.4(b)(1). 1
The Goolsbys ultimately appealed the violation to the
superior court, which ruled in their favor and determined that no breach

155. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 11-2-710).
156. Id. at *12.
157. Id. at *15.
158. This section was authored by Amy L. Hanna, attorney in the law firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Florida
(B.S., 2007); University of Florida Levin College of Law (J.D., 2010). Member, State Bars
of Georgia and Florida.
159. 324 Ga. App. 535, 751 S.E.2d 158 (2013).
160. Id. at 535, 751 S.E.2d at 160.
161. O.C.G-. § 48-5-7.4 (2010 & Supp. 2014).
162. Goolsby, 324 Ga. App. at 537, 751 S.E.2d at 161.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 538, 751 S.E.2d at 161 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4(bX 1)).

20141

REAL PROPERTY

169

had occurred because "[nmo statutory authority or case law was cited...
to prove that procuring or even operating a business
on the subject
65
property would result in a breach of the covenant."
Upon receiving the superior court's adverse decision, the board
appealed. 6 The court of appeals ruled in favor of the board and
vacated and remanded the case, but it did so on very narrow
grounds. 67 Judge McFadden determined that the superior court erred
"[tlo the extent [it] concluded that operating a business on the property
never breaches a covenant."6 " Rather, the court concluded that it is
possible to operate a business that violates the covenant:
[Ilf the taxpayer is operating... a business separate and apart from
the commercial production from or on the land of agricultural products,
and the business is not "incidental, occasional, intermediate or temporary" but is "detrimental to or in conflict with [the property's] primary
purpose," then the land does not qualify [as a bona fide conservationuse property] .16
Resting on this very narrow issue, the court of appeals vacated and
remanded the case to the superior court. 70
In Newton imber Co., L.L.L.P. v. Monroe County Board of Tax
Assessors,7' the landowners petitioned for a writ of mandamus to
require the county board of tax assessors (the county board) to certify
their appeals to the superior court. The Newton family, who collectively
owned thousands of acres in Monroe County, began contesting tax
assessments made by the county board in 2008 and, by 2012, had
amassed more than 100 separate tax appeals. When the Newtons were
unsatisfied with the board of equalization's decisions, they exercised
their right to appeal to the superior court. They did not, however, pay
the necessary filing fees to the superior court.' 2 Despite their failure

165. Id. at 539, 751 S.E.2d at 162 (quoting the superior court opinion).
166. Id. at 535, 751 S.E.2d at 159-60.
167. Id. at 540-41, 751 S.E.2d at 163.
168. Id. at 539, 751 S.E.2d at 162 (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 540, 751 S.E.2d at 162 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting GA. CoMp. R. & REGS. 560-11-6.02(e) (2004)).
170. Id. at 540-41, 751 S.E.2d at 163. Judge Boggs concurred and specifically noted
that the court was forced to vacate and remand this matter because of the language in the
superior court's order improperly concluding that operating a business is never a breach
of the covenant. Id. at 541, 751 S.E.2d at 163 (Boggs, J., concurring fully and specially).
"[in the absence of the legal conclusion in the trial court's order, this court would be
required to affirm." Id. at 542, 751 S.E.2d at 164.
171. 295 Ga. 29, 755 S.E.2d 770 (2014).
172. Given the large number of appeals filed by the Newtons, and because some of
those appeals were consolidated, there was also some confusion about how much the
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to pay the fees, the Newtons sought a writ of mandamus to compel the
county board to certify its appeals. The county board asserted that it
was not required to do so unless and until the Newtons paid their filing
fees, and the two sides became involved in an extended dispute.173
The superior court ultimately concluded that the Newtons were
required to pay filing fees to the clerk before a civil action was filed and
denied the Newtons the extraordinary relief they sought.174 The
supreme court affirmed, explicitly holding "that payment of the
appropriate filing fee is a prerequisite
to further action in regard to a
"1 75
tax appeal to the superior court.
In Columbus Board of Tax Assessors v. Yeoman, 76 the supreme court
17
affirmed a ruling that the 2010 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)
controls over a local constitutional amendment (LCA) when determining
the fair market value of a recently purchased homestead property in
Muscogee County for city-county government taxing purposes. 78 John
Yeoman purchased a house in Muscogee County for $665,000 in April
2010. In March of the following year, he filed a timely appeal for a
homestead exemption. The board of tax assessors assessed the property
at a fair market value of $1,622,013, and Yeoman appealed the
assessment. 179 Yeoman ultimately obtained an assessment of $665,000
from the board of equalization, which relied on the 2010 amendment to
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3), and set the fair market value at "the transaction
amount of the most recent arm's length, bona fide sale" from the
previous year. 80 The board of tax assessors appealed, arguing that
the LCA, which set the fair market value for ad valorem taxation
purposes at "the fair market value of the property ... as of January 1
of the first year when homestead exemption is allowed," conflicts with
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3).181 The board then argued that, because a local
constitutional amendment controls over a statute when the two conflict,

Newtons owed in terms of filing fees. See id. at 35-36, 755 S.E.2d at 775.
173. Id. at 29-31, 33-36, 755 S.E.2d at 771-75.
174. Id. at 35, 755 S.E.2d at 775.
175. Id. at 36, 755 S.E.2d at 775.
176. 293 Ga. 107, 744 S.E.2d 18 (2013).
177. Ga. S. Bill 346, Reg. Sess. (2010); see also O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3) (2010 & Supp.

2014).
178.
179.
180.
181.

Yeoman, 293 Ga. at 107, 744 S.E.2d at 19.
Id. at 108, 744 S.E.2d at 19-20.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A § 48-5-2(3)).
Id. at 107, 744 S.E.2d at 19 (quoting Ga. H.R. Res. 271, Reg. Sess., 1981 Ga.

House J. 1274).
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the method for determining the fair market value contained in the LCA
should prevail.' 82
The supreme court disagreed with the board, finding there was no
conflict between the two provisions." Indeed, it held that the LCA
does not specify how to determine the value, it only specifies when the
value must be determined.TM The LCA does specify, however, that its
terms are "[slubject to the conditions and limitations specified by
law"-including O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)."" The supreme court concluded
that nothing prevented the board from using the method outlined in
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3): use the actual market-determined value as the fair
market value on January 1 of the relevant year as set forth in the
LCA.' 6 As a result, no conflict existed, and the trial court's judgment
8 7
in favor of Yeoman was affirmed.

In SPH Glynn, LLC v. Glynn County Board of Tax Assessors, the
court of appeals upheld the superior court's determination that the
statutory moratorium on increases in the assessed value of all property
provided by former O.C.G.A. § 48-5B-1 89 is unaffected by the assignment of new parcel numbers. 19° SPH Glynn purchased a 6,881-acre
parcel in 2008 that received a fair market value of $2,612,027.60 from
the board of tax assessors that year. The property was not given a
separate parcel number when SPH Glynn purchased it. The following
year, however, the board assigned a parcel number to the property on
January 1 and gave the property a fair market value of more than $8
million.191

SPH Glynn did not appeal the 2009 assessment, but it did appeal the
2010 and 2011 assessments.' 92 The landowner argued that the board's
increased assessment in 2009 violated O.C.G.A. § 48-5B-1, "which
provided for a moratorium on increases in the assessed value of property
for the taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2009." 193 The

182. Id. at 108, 744 S.E.2d at 20.
183. Id. at 109, 744 S.E.2d at 20.
184. Id.
185. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ga. H.R. Res. 271, Reg. Sess., 1981 Ga. House
J. 1274).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 109-10, 744 S.E.2d at 20.
188. 326 Ga. App. 196, 756 S.E.2d 282 (2014), cert denied.
189. O.C.G.A. § 48-5B-1 (2010), repealed by Ga. H.R. Bill 233, Reg. Sess. (2009). The
statute's repeal in 2011 was built into the statute. Ga. H.R. Bill 233, Reg. Sess. (2009) § 1.
190. SPH Glynn, LLC, 326 Ga. App. at 199-200, 756 S.E.2d at 286.
191. Id. at 196, 756 S.E.2d at 284.
192. Id. at 196-97, 756 S.E.2d at 284.
193. Id. at 197, 756 S.E.2d at 284.
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board countered by arguing that, because the property received a new
parcel number on January 1, 2009, the parcel had 4 never been taxed
apply.1
prior to 2009 and O.C.G.A. § 48-5B-1 did not
The court of appeals ultimately sided with SPH Glynn, holding that
the statute was not written in terms of "parcels" but "properties," and
allowing the board to ignore the moratorium simply by assigning a new
95
parcel number would frustrate the objective of O.C.G.A. § 48-5B-1.'
In Porche v. Noriega,'96 the court of appeals determined that "substantial compliance" with O.C.G.A. § 48-4-78117 is insufficient to bring
9
an action for in rem foreclosure of a tax lien. ' The City of Woodstock
recorded abatement liens against the Noriegas' property for failure to
abate a nuisance despite explicit court orders to do so. After the
Noriegas failed to discharge the abatement liens, Robert Porche, the
City's tax commissioner, filed petitions against the Noriegas in superior
court for in rem ad valorem tax foreclosure of the abatement liens.
Although the petitions named the Noriegas as respondents, they failed
to name the property itself.'99 The superior court denied the petitions
because "they were not brought against the property to be foreclosed as
°°
Porche appealed,
statutorily required" by O.C.G.A. § 48-4-78(g).
with the statute
complied
substantially
petitions
the
arguing that
Noriegas.201
property-the
the
of
owners
the
because they named
The court of appeals affirmed.20 2 The court explicitly disagreed with
Porche and found that the statute clearly and unambiguously requires
that in rem ad valorem foreclosures be brought against the property,
any room for potential application of "substantial complieliminating
20 3
ance."

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 199, 756 S.E.2d at 286.
Id. at 200, 756 S.E.2d at 286.
325 Ga. App. 524, 754 S.E.2d 112 (2014).
O.C.G.A. § 48-4-78 (2010).
Porche, 325 Ga. App. at 526-27, 754 S.E.2d at 114.
Id. at 525, 754 S.E.2d at 113.
Id. at 525-26, 754 S.E.2d at 113.
Id. at 526, 754 S.E.2d at 114.
Id. at 527, 754 S.E.2d at 114.
Id. at 526-27, 754 S.E.2d at 114.
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20
TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY

173
4

In Pack v. Mahan,"' the supreme court reversed a superior court
order requiring equitable partition of property owned by two parties as
tenants in common. 0°
However, the court affirmed the superior
court's remedy of a public auction of the property and remanded the case
for an auction under statutory partition.0 7
In Pack, Mahan sued seeking equitable partition, and Pack responded
seeking statutory partition with property divided by metes and bounds.
After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court found that the property
could not be divided by metes and bounds, and ordered the property to
be sold as a whole and the proceeds divided between the parties.2 8
The supreme court held that ordering the partition to be equitable was
in error because no grounds existed to support a finding that statutory
partition was inequitable or that the case was unusual or complex.20 9
However, the court determined that sufficient evidence existed for the
superior court to find that the property could not be subdivided by metes
and bounds, and that the respondent lacked the resources to purchase
the interests of the petitioner.210 Thus, a public sale was the appropri21
ate remedy. '
Importantly, even though the superior court committed error by
ordering an equitable partition rather than a statutory partition, that
error was "nominal," and the remedy ordered was a legal remedy and
the correct one.212 Because Georgia law provides for one form of
action, the fact that the superior court ordered the sale of the property
in equity rather than in law did not invalidate the remedy it prescribed. 1 3 The supreme court reversed only the parts of the superior
court's order that nominally referenced equitable partition and remanded
the case for amendment of the order and completion of the superior

204. This section was authored by Jay Buller, attorney in the law firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. Louisiana State
University (B.S., 2004); Emory University School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2008). Member,
State and Federal Bars of Georgia.
205. 294 Ga. 496, 755 S.E.2d 126 (2014).
206. Id. at 496, 755 S.E.2d at 127-28.
207. Id. at 496, 755 S.E.2d at 128.
208. Id. at 496, 755 S.E.2d at 127.
209. Id. at 498, 755 S.E.2d at 129.
210. Id. at 499, 755 S.E.2d at 129-30.
211. Id. at 500, 755 S.E.2d at 130.
212. Id. at 498, 755 S.E.2d at 129.
213. Id. at 499, 755 S.E.2d at 129.
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court's chosen remedy of a public sale.214
Kim v. FirstIntercontinentalBank215 involved an action for equitable
subrogation and reformation of a security deed that included an incorrect
legal description for a parcel of property that contained a commercial
shopping center. First Intercontinental Bank, the petitioner seeking
equitable subrogation reformation, loaned funds to the respondents and
refinanced two prior security deeds. The borrower on this new loan,
Han, transferred half of his interests to a second owner, Kim, but this
series of deeds was not recorded. However, the security deed executed
in favor of First Intercontinental Bank during this transaction contained
an incorrect legal description for a neighboring parcel that the respondent debtors did not own. First Intercontinental Bank sought to reform
the legal description of their deed and equitable subrogation because
they paid off their prior security deeds. The superior court granted
equitable subrogation and reformed the security deed to correct the legal
description, and Kim appealed.2 16
Kim argued that First Intercontinental Bank was barred from
obtaining equitable subrogation because it was guilty of culpable or
Kim argued that the petitioner had actual
inexcusable neglect.
knowledge of his interests when it accepted a security deed only from
Han because Kim's tenants were in possession of the property.217 The
court of appeals rejected this contention, concluding that the petitioner
would not have been able to tell whether the tenants were Han's.2 18
Kim also argued that he would suffer prejudice if the petitioner were
allowed to step into first position for the property through equitable
subrogation. 21 9 The court of appeals rejected this argument because
Kim never had a first position interest, and the only reason he could
22
claim one was because the petitioner paid off the prior existing liens. 1
However, Kim was successful in limiting the amount of equitable
subrogation. 22 1 The court of appeals held that First Intercontinental
Bank's first-position lien was limited to the amount actually used to
satisfy the prior liens on the property-effectively barring a first position
interest for slightly more than a third of the new security deed.222
Kim also argued that reformation was improper because the mistake

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 501, 755 S.E.2d at 130-31.
326 Ga. App. 424, 756 S.E.2d 655 (2014).
Id. at 425, 755 S.E.2d at 657-58.
Id. at 426, 755 S.E.2d at 658.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 426-27, 756 S.E.2d at 658.
Id. at 427, 755 S.E.2d at 659.
•Id.
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in the legal description was not mutual because Kim was not a party to
the deed to make a mistake. He also argued that he had no privity with
the petitioner and that the petitioner had notice of his interests.2 23
The court of appeals rejected these arguments because a mutual mistake
need only be mutual between the parties to the agreement at the time
the agreement is signed.2" Additionally, the privity between Kim and
Han transferred to First Intercontinental Bank. 2 Finally, notice was
not an issue because First Intercontinental Bank had notice only that
tenants occupied the property, not that Kim owned an interest.2 6 The
court of appeals affirmed reformation to correct the legal description.2 27
In DeCay v. Houston,228 a foreclosure-sale purchaser sued a foreclosure-sale vendor to quiet title to four tracts of land, two of which were
indisputably conveyed to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale and two
tracts which were in dispute. The four relevant tracts were two
residential units of a duplex, an improved driveway, and an improved
rear parking area. The foreclosure-sale purchaser, DeCay, purchased
the property at a foreclosure-sale auction from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The sales contract conveyed the property
located at 629 Boulevard in Atlanta, Georgia, subject to all other liens,
deeds, and encumbrances. Prior to the foreclosure sale, the prior owner
had conveyed its interest in the second of the two residential units and
the rear parking area to a third party. Thus, DeCay took title through
the foreclosure in only the first residential unit and the improved
229
driveway.
DeCay sued to quiet title in all four tracts and sued the FDIC for
breach of contract on the theory that it did not convey full title to the
property. The superior court appointed a special master. The first
special master resigned due to a conflict, and a second special master
was appointed. The second special master found that title to the second
unit and the rear parking lot had been transferred before the foreclosure
sale and were not conveyed by the sale. The superior court adopted that
finding and granted summary judgment to the FDIC on the breach of
contract claim.230
DeCay challenged the special master's report on appeal on the grounds

223. Id. at 428, 756 S.E.2d at 659.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 428, 755 S.E.2d at 659-60.
Id. at 428, 756 S.E.2d at 660.
295 Ga. 223, 758 S.E.2d 286 (2014).
Id. at 223-24, 225, 758 S.E.2d at 288, 289.

230. Id.
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that the report was tainted because the first special master was
conflicted out of serving on the case. 23' The supreme court determined
that the second special master had no conflict, and a conflict of a prior
special master did not impugn the neutrality of her replacement. 2
The supreme court then determined there was sufficient evidence to
affirm the superior court's decision to accept the special master's
findings that only the first residential unit and the improved driveway
Finally, the supreme court
were conveyed in the foreclosure. 23
affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the
FDIC.2 ' The supreme court reasoned that the sales contract specifically provided that it was conveying the property in question subject to
all recorded deeds, covenants, and easements. 2 5 The deed transferring
the second residential unit and the rear parking area were recorded
before the foreclosure, and thus, the FDIC did not attempt to promise to
provide more title than it conveyed.23 6
In 915 Indian Trail, LLC v. State Bank & Trust Co.,27 a bank sued
for equitable subrogation to move a lien from second to first position
opposed to an intervening lien. The bank refinanced a prior loan on the
condition that an existing second lien on the property would be cancelled
to allow the bank to retain first position. The borrower and the second
lien holder agreed, and the second lien was cancelled. However, just
before closing on the refinance, the borrower granted a lien to a party
closely related to the original holder of the cancelled second lien. This
new lien was recorded before the bank's transaction closed, but it was
unavailable for examination on the clerk of court's statewide online deed
records search service at the time of the later transaction.2 s
The holder of the secretly-recorded lien foreclosed on its lien, and a
closely related entity (915 Indian Trail, LLC) obtained title to the
property. The bank's successor became aware of the foreclosure and the
intervening lien when preparing its own foreclosure. It sued for
equitable subrogation to obtain first lien position against the interests
of 915 Indian Trail, LLC. The superior court granted equitable
subrogation because the bank had paid off the prior first priority lien to
obtain its own first priority position. The new owner, 915 Indian Trail,

231. Id. at 224, 758 S.E.2d at 288.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 225, 758 S.E.2d at 289.
Id.

236. Id.
237. 328 Ga. App. 524, 759 S.E.2d 654 (2014).
238. Id. at 524-25, 759 S.E.2d at 656-57.
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LLC, appealed.239

The new owner, 915 Indian Trail, LLC, argued that the bank was
barred from obtaining equitable subrogation because it was guilty of
culpable or inexcusable neglect by failing to perform a title search after
the closing of the property or before its attempt to foreclose on the
property.240 The court of appeals rejected this argument because there
was no proposition of law in Georgia that requires a lien holder to
perform title searches after the closing of its loan.2"
The court of appeals held that 915 Indian Trail, LLC would not suffer
any prejudice through equitable subrogation.242 The court of appeals
reasoned that simply being subject to the senior lien was not prejudice
because the purchaser was aware of the existence of the lien and was
aware that the bank's lien should have been senior to the lien that was
foreclosed on to give it title. 24 The court of appeals affirmed the grant
of summary judgment as to equitable subrogation.'"
IX.

TRESPASS & NUISANCE 245

During the survey period, the court of appeals clarified and honed the
highly fact-contingent analysis Georgia courts must apply to determine
whether a municipality is liable for nuisance, an exception from the
otherwise broad insulation from liability conferred by sovereign
immunity."4 While a municipality cannot be held liable for negligence, it may still be held liable for damages caused by its creation or
maintenance of a nuisance. 47 Thus, the critical determination in any
case against a municipality is whether a municipality's conduct supports
a cause of action for nuisance or mere negligence-that is the difference
between recovery and summary dismissal. 248

239. Id. at 527, 759 S.E.2d at 658.
240. Id. at 529, 759 S.E.2d at 659.
241. Id. at 529-30, 759 S.E.2d at 659-60.
242. Id. at 531, 759 S.E.2d at 660.
243. Id. at 530-31, 749 S.E.2d at 660.
244. Id. at 535, 759 S.E.2d at 663.
245. This section was authored by Kristin S. Tucker, attorney in the law firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. Agnes Scott College
(B.A., magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, 2005); Emory University School of Law (J.D.,
2009). Member, State and Federal Bars of Georgia and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit.
246. See generallyJ.N. Legacy Grp., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 322 Ga. App. 475,745 S.E.2d
721 (2013); Atkinson v. City of Atlanta, 325 Ga. App. 70, 752 S.E.2d 130 (2013).
247. J.N. Legacy Grp., Inc., 322 Ga. App. at 479, 745 S.E.2d at 726.
248. Atkinson, 325 Ga. App. at 73, 752 S.E.2d at 133.
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9
In J.N. Legacy Group, Inc. v. City of Dallas," J.N. Legacy Group
(J.N.) sued the City of Dallas (the City) for failure to maintain a public
sewer line. After heavy rains in September of 2009, the sewer line
backed up and overflowed into J.N.'s building through the toilet,
covering the floor of the entire office area in raw sewage. J.N. notified
the City, and the next day the City retained ServPro to clean the
building, remove the carpets, and take various measures to dry out the
building and eliminate odors. The City also installed a backflow
prevention device to prevent future flooding. Notwithstanding ServPro's
efforts, foul odors continued to permeate the office building, causing J.N.
to have to reduce its tenant's rent because the tenant did not have full
use of the property. J.N. eventually replaced some of the sheetrock in
the building and had additional work done to repair the property,
incurring costs of $5,000. J.N. then submitted a claim for partial
to City council, who took no action-effectively denying
reimbursement
250
the claim.
J.N. sued the City for nuisance and violation of ministerial duties.
The City moved for summary judgment on both claims, arguing that a
municipality could not be held liable for negligent maintenance of a
sewer system and, while the City could be held liable for maintaining a
nuisance, J.N. failed to establish a nuisance existed. The City's
argument that J.N. failed to establish nuisance was based on deposition
testimony from one of J.N.'s owners that the 2009 sewage overflow was
the only overflow that had occurred since J.N. acquired the property in
entered summary judgment in favor of the City on
1999. The trial court
25
all of J.N.'s claims. '
Considering the issues on appeal, the court of appeals affirmed
summary judgment on J.N.'s breach of ministerial duties claim,
explaining that sovereign immunity defeated any negligence claim
against the City.252 Turning to J.N.'s nuisance claim, the court of
appeals began with the general premise that "[w]hile a municipality
enjoys sovereign immunity from liability for negligent acts done in the
exercise of a governmental function, it may be liable for damages it
a third party from the creation or maintenance of a nuicauses 25to
3
sance."

249.
250.
251.
252.

322 Ga. App. 475, 745 S.E.2d 721 (2013).
Id. at 475-77, 745 S.E.2d at 723-24.
Id. at 475, 477, 745 S.E.2d at 723, 724-25.
Id. at 479, 745 S.E.2d at 725.

253. Id. at 479, 745 S.E.2d at 726 (alteration in original) (quoting Hibbs v. City of
Riverdale, 267 Ga. 337, 337, 478 S.E.2d 121, 122 (1996)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Thus, the critical determination is whether the municipality's conduct
gives rise to the creation or maintenance of a nuisance or merely an
action for negligence.254 The supreme court has established guidelines
for determining municipal liability for nuisance:
[Tihe defect or degree of misfeasance must exceed mere negligence (as
distinguished from a single act); the act complained of must be of some
duration and the maintenance of the act or defect must be continuous
or regularly repetitious; and there must be a failure of municipal action
within a reasonable time after knowledge of the defect or dangerous
condition.2 5
Applying these factors, the court of appeals reasoned that the critical
factual issue in this case was whether there had been repeated flooding.256 Although the City based its nuisance argument on the deposition testimony of one of J.N.'s owners that the flooding was a one-time
occurrence, J.N. had introduced rebuttal evidence in the form of two
affidavits identifying other instances of flooding.257 In light of this
rebuttal evidence, the court of appeals held that there was sufficient
evidence to create a jury issue as to whether the City had created a
nuisance.258 Consequently, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment on J.N.'s nuisance claim. 259
In Atkinson v. City of Atlanta,26 ° the court of appeals again analyzed
municipal liability for nuisance, this time applying a slightly expanded
analysis to reach its decision.2 61 In April of 2007, a water main broke
next to Denis Atkinson's home on Atlanta's West Wesley Road,
"damaging Atkinson's yard, trees, shrubs, driveway, and 35 feet of an
ornamental fence."262 The water flow continued overnight and dug out
a five-foot deep pit forty-feet wide and thirty-feet long, creating a virtual
lake that stretched across his property and onto his neighbor's proper263
ty.

The City of Atlanta (the City) was notified and began efforts to repair
the water main break the same night. The City could not stop the flow

254.
255.
122).
256.
257.
258.

Id.
Id. at 479-80, 745 S.E.2d at 726 (quoting Hibbs, 267 Ga. at 337-38, 478 S.E.2d at
Id. at 480, 745 S.E.2d at 726.
Id.
Id. at 481, 745 S.E.2d at 727.

259. Id. at 482, 745 S.E.2d at 727.
260. 325 Ga. App. 70, 752 S.E.2d 130 (2013).

261. Id. at 73, 752 S.E.2d at 133.
262. Id. at 70-71, 752 S.E.2d at 132.
263. Id. at 71, 752 S.E.2d at 132.
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that night, but Atkinson was unable to recall exactly how long it took.
Atkinson met with a City official "several days" after the incident, who
assessed the work needed to repair Atkinson's property. The City
eventually filled in the pit and repaired the fence, but again, Atkinson
could not recall when the repairs took place. Atkinson repaired the
driveway and yard himself. Unsatisfied with the pace of the City's
repairs to his property, Atkinson filed a claim with the City, which was
denied.2" 4
Atkinson sued the City for negligence (a claim which he later
abandoned) and nuisance. As grounds for his nuisance claims, Atkinson
alleged the following: (1) that the City failed to respond in a timely
manner to the leaking water main, resulting in extensive water damage
to the property, and (2) that the City failed to respond in a timely
manner to repair the damage caused by the water main leak, creating
a hazardous and dangerous condition on Atkinson's property for an
extended period of time. The trial court entered summary judgment in
favor of the City on Atkinson's nuisance claim. 65
The court of appeals began its analysis with a list of conditions that
must be met to establish municipal liability for nuisance: (1) the act or
condition must be repeated or continuous (and cause the hurt, inconvenience, or injury which constitutes nuisance); (2) the municipality must
know of or have a duty to know of the condition; (3) if the municipality
did not cause the act or condition, it must have a duty to rectify it; (4)
"[tihe defect or degree of misfeasance must exceed mere negligence (as
distinguished from a single act);" and (5) if the municipality has a duty
to rectify the condition, it must fail to do so within a reasonable amount
2 66
of time.
Applying the factors above, the court of appeals determined that there
2 67
was no evidence that the City failed to act within a reasonable time.
Moreover, the water main break occurred only once, and therefore was
not repetitious.2 68 Even assuming the City had caused the water main
to break on this one occasion, there would still be no cause of action for
nuisance because "an isolated act of negligence cannot form the basis of
a nuisance claim."2 69 Because neither the main break nor the flooding

264. Id.
265. Id. at 71-72, 752 S.E.2d at 132-33.
266. Id. at 73, 752 S.E.2d at 133 (quoting Hibbs, 267 Ga. at 338, 478 S.E.2d at 122);
see also O.C.G.A. § 41-1-1 (2014) (defining nuisance as "anything that causes hurt,
inconvenience, or damage to another").
267. Atkinson, 325 Ga. App. at 74, 752 S.E.2d at 133-34.
268. Id. at 74, 752 S.E.2d at 134.
269. Id. (quoting Goode v. City of Atlanta, 274 Ga. App. 233, 236, 617 S.E.2d 210, 212
(2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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were repetitious or continuous and because Atkinson had failed to
establish that the City had a duty to make all the repairs on the
property (rather than just compensating him for the damage), the court
of appeals affirmed the trial court's order granting summary judgment
in favor of the City on Atkinson's nuisance claim. 270
X.

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF

27 1

LAW

For the past several years, this Survey has reported and occasionally
commented upon the Formal Advisory Opinions issued by the supreme
court regarding the unauthorized practice of law insofar as such practice
would apply to real estate closings and particularly "Witness-only
closings."2 7 2 The debate continues.

A historical perspective of the issue, which goes back several decades,
can be useful. In 1986, the supreme court stated, 'The closing of [a] real
estate transaction constitutes the practice of law as defined by O.C.G.A
§ 15-19-50," making it clear that it was "ethically improper for lawyers
to permit nonlawyers to close real estate transactions." 273 The statute
did not ban the delegation of certain tasks to non-lawyers subject to the
supervision of a lawyer.27' "The lawyer cannot, however, delegate to
a nonlawyer the responsibility to 'close' the real estate transaction
without the participation of an attorney."2 5 Moreover,
[D]elegation of activities which ordinarily comprise the practice of law
is proper only if the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with the
client involved, supervises and directs the work delegated to the
paralegal and assumes complete ultimate professional responsibility for
the work product produced by the paralegal. Supervision of the work
of the paralegal by the attorney must be direct and constant
to avoid
276
any charges of aiding the unauthorized practice of law.

In 2000, the supreme court addressed whether a lawyer could conduct

270. Id. at 74-75, 752 S.E.2d at 134-35.
271. This section was authored by L. Clint Crosby, shareholder in the law firm of
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.S., 1994; J.D., 1997).

272. See generally Linda S. Finley, Real Property,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 64
L. REv. 255, 257 (2012) (hereinafter Real Property 2012]; Linda S. Finley, Real
Property,Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 56 MERCER L. REV. 395, 396 (2004).
273. Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 (Ga. Supreme Court May 12, 1989), available
at http://www.gabar.org/barrules/handbookdetail.cfm?what=rule&id=505 (last visited Aug.
20, 2014); see also O.C.G.A. § 15-19-50 (2014).
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closings by telephone when only a paralegal or notary was present to
27 7
The court
obtain and witness signatures on the closing documents.
stated that "[tihe critical issue in this inquiry is what constitutes the
participation of the attorney in the closing transaction. The lawyer must
be in control of the closing process from beginning to end. The
2 78
The court
supervision of the paralegal must be direct and constant."
further stated,
Standard 24 is not met by the lawyer being called on the telephone
during the course of the closing process for the purpose of responding
to questions or reviewing documents. The lawyer's physical presence
at a closing will assure that there is supervision of the work of the
paralegal which is direct and constant.279
In 2003, the State Bar of Georgia's Standing Committee on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL) revisited the issue of witness-only
closings. 280 "A 'witness only closing' is one in which an individual
presides over the execution of deeds of conveyance and other closing
documents, but purports to do so merely as a witness and notary, not as
someone who is practicing law.""' The committee stated that
the execution of a deed of conveyance is so intimately interwoven with
the other elements of the closing process so as to be inseparable from
the closing as a whole.... To view the execution of a deed of
conveyance as something separate and distinct from the other phases
of the closing process-and thus as something other than the practice
of law-would not only be forced and artificial, it would run counter to
the opinions of the Court. 2
However, the committee also stated that a "Georgia lawyer who
conducts a witness only closing does not, of course, engage in the
unlicensed practice of law. There may well exist, however, professional
liability or disciplinary concerns that fall outside the scope of this
In adopting the advisory opinion, the supreme court
opinion."m
stated, "Because we agree with the UPL Standing Committee that only

277. Formal Advisory Opinion No. 00-3 (Ga. Supreme Court Feb. 11, 2000), available
athttp://www.gabar.org/barrules/handbookdetail.cfin.what-rule&id=447 (last visited Aug.
20, 2014).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Unauthorized Practice of Law Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2 (Ga. Bar April 22,
= 42
=
2003), availableat http://www.gabar.org/barruleshandbookdetail.cfm?what rule&id 5
(last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
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a licensed Georgia attorney may prepare or facilitate the execution of a
deed of conveyance, we approve UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2."M
In 2012, the Georgia General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 365, 2s
which amended O.C.G.A. § 44-14-13. s6 The amendments included
extensive changes to the definition of settlement agent. 287 The new
definition states, "'Settlement agent' means the lender or an active
member of the State Bar of Georgia responsible for conducting the
settlement and disbursement of the settlement proceeds."2M
The
amendments also expanded the application of the statute:
This Code section shall apply ... to transactions involving purchase
money loans made by a lender, or refinance loans made by the current
or a new lender, which loans will be secured by deeds to secure debt or
mortgages on real estate within the State of Georgia containing not
more than four residential dwelling units, whether or not such deeds
to secure debt or mortgages have a first-priority status. 289
The amendments eliminated the exemption for same-lender refinance
loans, restricted the persons or entities that may act as settlement
agents, and explicitly required that the settlement agent disburse the
settlement proceeds.290
In August of 2012, the State Bar of Georgia published a proposed
formal advisory opinion dealing with the responsibilities of an attorney
who participates in real estate closings.29 1 After a comment period, the
opinion was revised and republished in December of 2013 as Formal
Advisory Opinion 13-1 (FAO 13-1).292
FAO 13-1 marks a reversal from UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2,
which provides
that a licensed Georgia attorney may perform a witness
only closing. 293 FAQ 13-1 expressly states, "A Lawyer who purports to

284. In re UPL Advisory Op. 2003-2,277 Ga. 472,473, 588 S.E.2d 741, 741 (2003) (per

curiam); see also Unauthorized Practice of Law Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2, supra note
280.
285. Ga. S. Bill 365, Reg. Sess (2012).
286. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-13 (2002 & Supp. 2014). This legislation is also discussed in
Finley, Real Property 2012, supra note 272.
287. See Ga. S. Bill 365.
288. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-13(aX10).
289. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-13(b).
290. See generally O.C.G.A. § 44-14-13.
291. FirstPublicationof ProposedFormalAdvisory Opinion No. 10-R2, GA. B.J., Aug.
2012, at 78.
292. Second Publication of Proposed FormalAdvisory Opinion No. 10-R2 hereinafter
known as "FormalAdvisory Opinion No. 13-1," GA. B.J., Dec. 2013, at 73 [hereinafter FAO
13-1].
293. See Unauthorized Practice of Law Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2, supra note 280.
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handle a closing in the limited role of a witness violates the Georgia
Rules of Professional Conduct." 9 4 While FAO 13-1 does provide that
a closing lawyer can rely on documents prepared by others-a common
practice in real estate closings-the closing lawyer is responsible for the
contents of the documents and adopts the documents by participating in
the closing process. 5 FAO 13-1 also clarifies that closing funds must
be deposited into and disbursed from a trust account.29 6
The Formal Advisory Opinion Committee also stated that it was filing
FAO 13-1 with the State Bar of Georgia.2 97 Once filed, the supreme
court has the option of either declining review or accepting, rejecting, or
modifying the proposed FAO.2 98 Until acted on by the supreme court,
FAO 13-1 is only binding on the State Bar of Georgia and the State
Disciplinary Board.299 This new prohibition on witness closing by lawyers is a significant
change considering its inconsistency with the UPL Advisory Opinion No.
2003-2, which expressly permitted such closings and was adopted by the
supreme court.3 0 As of this writing, FAO 13-1 has been taken up for
consideration by the supreme court, so some clarity regarding witness
closings will be provided in the coming months.3 01
30 2

XI. ZONING
In Mortgage Alliance Corp. v. Pickens County,303 the supreme court
held that a letter setting forth a county's position on a zoning issue did
not constitute a final decision and was not ripe for judicial review.30 4
The plaintiff, a subdivision developer, submitted a preliminary plat for
a proposed subdivision called "Silverstone" in Pickens County, Georgia
(the County). The County's director of zoning and planning informally
advised the developer that the project would be reviewed for compliance

294.
295.
296.
297.

FAO 13-1, supra note 292.
Id.
Id. at 74.
Notice of FilingFormalAdvisory Opinion in Supreme Court of Georgia, GA. B.J.,

Dec. 2013, at 72.
298. GA. R. & REGS. STATE BAR 4-403(e).
299. Id.
300. In re UPL Advisory Op. 2003-2, 277 Ga. at 473, 588 S.E.2d at 741.
301. In re Formal Advisory Op. No. 13-1, No. S14U0705 (Ga. May 19, 2014).
302. This section was authored by Joann E. Johnston, attorney in the law firm of
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
South Carolina (B.A. & B.S., magna cum laude, 2001); Emory University School of Law
(J.D., with honors, 2004). Member, State Bars of Georgia and South Carolina.
303. 294 Ga. 212, 751 S.E.2d 51 (2013).
304. Id. at 216-17, 751 S.E.2d at 54-55.
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with existing county land-use ordinances. The County's land-development officer denied approval of the preliminary plat as well as a revised
plat. The developer did not appeal those rulings. Thereafter, the
County adopted amendments to its land-use requirements. The County
commissioner then sent the developer a letter stating that it was the
County's position that the Silverstone project was required to comply
with the amended requirements.0 °
Two years later, °6 the developer filed a complaint for inverse
condemnation against both the County and county officials. 0 7 The
developer claimed that the commissioner's letter constituted "a final
decision... to apply the current zoning and development procedures" to
the property, forcing the developer to abandon the Silverstone project. 8' The superior court granted the County's motion for summary
judgment, finding that the letter constituted a final decision, but the
developer's inverse condemnation claim was barred because the
complaint was not filed within thirty days of the commissioner's
letter.0 9 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court's ruling."0
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, but
held that the commissioner's letter was not a final decision on the
Silverstone project.3 ' The court observed that "the letter may have
been a strong indication of how the County would ultimately decide a
proposal by [the developer]

. . ., but the letter had no operative

effect."812 Accordingly, "there was no 'decision' ... for [the developer]
to appeal under O.C.G.A. § 5-3-20."01 The court further noted that if
the developer had wanted a final decision, it could have filed a new plat,
and if that plat was denied, it could have filed an administrative appeal
to the county commissioner.1 4 In the alternative, the court noted, the
developer could have filed an application with the commissioner for a
zoning variance or rezoning of the property, which if denied would have
305. Id. at 213-14, 751 S.E.2d at 53.
306. In the interim period, the developer submitted a new preliminary plan for the
property for a subdivision called "Hampton Farms" and an application to rezone the
property for the project. Id. at 215, 751 S.E.2d at 53-54. The commissioner approved the
rezoning after a hearing, but the Hampton Farms project ultimately failed due to the steep
decline in the real estate market. Id. at 215, 751 S.E.2d at 54.
307. Id. at 215, 751 S.E.2d at 54.
308. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
309. Id.
310. Id.; see also Mortg. Alliance Corp. v. Pickens County, 316 Ga. App. 755, 730 S.E.2d
471 (2012).
311. Mortg.Alliance Corp., 294 Ga. at 216-17, 220, 751 S.E.2d at 55, 57.
312. Id. at 216-17, 751 S.E.2d at 55.
313. Id. at 217, 751 S.E.2d at 55; see also O.C.G.A. § 5-3-20 (2013).
314. Mortg. Alliance Corp., 294 Ga. at 217, 751 S.E.2d at 55.
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been appealable to the superior court. 15 Because the developer failed
to pursue either of these options, its inverse condemnation claim never
ripened for judicial review. 16
31 7
In Noble Parking,Inc. v. Centergy One Associates, LLC, the court
of appeals considered whether the legal non-conforming (or "grandfather18
ed") use of a property by Noble Parking, Inc. (Noble) as a park-forhire surface parking lot was superseded when the lot was temporarily
used for an outdoor horse show.319 When the show closed and Noble
returned to operating the paid parking lot, the City of Atlanta (the City)
notified Noble that the property's legal non-conforming use had been
superseded by a permitted use, and the property was now required to
conform with existing zoning ordinances. Rather than appealing, Noble
informed the City that it disagreed with the decision and continued to
operate the paid parking lot. 2 °
The owners of two adjacent properties subsequently filed suit against
Noble, seeking an injunction prohibiting Noble from continuing to
operate the paid parking lot and damages. The City also intervened and
filed its own complaint for injunctive relief. The superior court granted
summary judgment in favor of the City and partial summary judgment
in favor of the adjacent property owners, finding that Noble's use was
superseded by the permitted use of the property for a horse show and
that Noble's defenses were barred for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. 321
The court of appeals reversed, holding that Noble was not required to
exhaust administrative remedies before asserting defenses to the
adjacent property owners' lawsuit.32 The court noted that Noble "did
not seek a 'declaration in [sic] a court of equity'. . . nor did it 'circumvent
the review process' by institutinga collateral attack of the City's decision
3
that its nonconforming use of the property had been superseded." '
As a result, Noble was not barred from defending the action merely

315. Id.
316. Id. at 220, 751 S.E.2d at 57.
317. 326 Ga. App. 455, 756 S.E.2d 691 (2014).

318. Noble was not the owner of the property but instead operated the paid surface
parking lot. Id. at 456, 756 S.E.2d at 692.
319. Id. at 455-56, 756 S.E.2d at 692.
320. Id. at 456, 458, 756 S.E.2d at 692-93.
321. Id. at 456-57, 756 S.E.2d at 693.
322. Id. at 457-58, 756 S.E.2d at 693-94.
323. Id. at 457, 756 S.E.2d at 693 (quoting Powell v. City of Snellville, 266 Ga. 315,
316, 467 S.E.2d 540, 541 (1996); Mortg.Alliance Corp., 316 Ga. App. at 757, 730 S.E.2d at
474).
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because it failed to exhaust administrative remedies with the City."
The court of appeals also rejected the superior court's conclusion that
Noble's use of the property as a paid surface parking lot was superseded
by a permitted use. 325 The court found the term "permitted use" to
mean "a use generally allowed or authorized by the City Code."326 The
City code, however, provided that the use of the property for a horse
show could only be authorized by a special event permit, and the City
conceded that no such permit was issued.3 27 The court, interpreting
the plain and unambiguous meaning of the code, concluded that the
unpermitted use of the property for the horse show could not have
superseded Noble's vested right in its legal non-conforming use of the
3
property. 2

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id. at 458, 756 S.E.2d at 694.
Id. at 460, 756 S.E.2d at 695.
Id. at 459, 756 S.E.2d at 694.
Id. at 459, 756 S.E.2d at 694-95.
Id. at 459-60, 756 S.E.2d at 695.

